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Abstract
Information flow type systems provide an elegant means to enforce
confidentiality of programs. Using the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL, we
have specified an information flow type system for a concurrent language
featuring primitives for scheduling, and shown that typable programs are
non-interfering for a possibilistic notion of non-interference. The develop-
ment, which constitutes to our best knowledge the first machine-checked
account of non-interference for a concurrent language, takes advantage of
the proof assistant facilities to structure the proofs about different views of
the programming language and to identify the relationships among them
and the type system.
Our language and type system generalize previous work of Boudol and
Castellani [13], in particular by including arrays and lifting several con-
venient but unnecessary conditions in the syntax and type system of [13].
We illustrate the generality of our language and the usefulness of our type
system with a medium size example.
1 Introduction
Security mechanisms for mobile and embedded code, such as the Java Virtual
Machine and the Common Language Runtime, guarantee that downloaded ap-
plications are innocuous in the sense that they comply with some basic policies
related to typing, initialization or access control, etc. However, these mecha-
nisms are often too weak to provide effective protection against untrusted code:
see for example [30] for a critical analysis of the JavaCard firewall mechanism
and [1] for a critical analysis of the Java stack inspection mechanism.
In order to enforce stronger security properties that are increasingly required
in the context of security-sensitive applications, platforms for mobile and em-
bedded code should be equipped with appropriate mechanisms that guarantee
end-to-end security. One such mechanism for confidentiality is provided by in-
formation flow type systems, which perform at compile-time a static analysis
that tracks the flow of information in a program execution, and provide a means
to enforce statically that no information leakage will result from executing the
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program. In fact, such type systems guarantee non-interference [18], a high-level
security property that characterizes programs whose execution does not revel
secret information.
The definition of non-interference is conditioned by the attacker model which
describes the capabilities of the attacker, concerning for instance which obser-
vations it can make. In a sequential setting, there are several well-established
variants of non-interference, that typically consider the input/output behaviors
of programs. While the definitions of non-interference for sequential programs
are well understood, providing appropriate definitions of non-interference in a
concurrent setting is a difficult problem that currently remains under investiga-
tion; existing works either consider possibilistic security conditions that consider
all possible outputs of concurrent programs (instead of the output in a sequen-
tial setting), see e.g. [13], or probabilistic security conditions that consider the
probability distribution for the possible outputs of a program execution, see
e.g. [43, 46, 51].
Scheduling is an other delicate issue that must be considered. At the level
of the language definition, one can either extend the programming language
with primitives for scheduling and synchronization, or deal with scheduling at
the semantic level, i.e. at the level of the transition system. At the level of
information flow, scheduling introduces additional difficulties, because programs
that are deemed secure by possibilistic non-interference are subject to refinement
attacks. Indeed, using a scheduler to execute non-deterministic programs may
result in secure programs leaking confidential information. For example, the
program
(if h = 0 then skip else sleep(100)); l := 0 || l := 1
is likely to terminate with l = 0 if h = 0 and a round robin scheduler is used. In
order to avoid such refinement attacks, several approaches have been developed
to account for schedulers.
One common approach for handling scheduling in information flow analy-
ses is to focus on probabilistic non-interference, which deals with probabilistic
parallel composition (or a generalization of it that allows to compose an arbi-
trary number of programs in parallel) and considers the probability distribution
for the possible outputs of a program execution. For example, one can show
probabilistic non-interference of programs assuming that probabilities in paral-
lel composition are uniform [46, 51]. Another alternative is to adopt a stronger,
scheduler independent, notion of security; for example, one can isolate a large
class of schedulers, potentially probabilistic, and require programs to be secure
for all the schedulers in this class [43].
Another approach, which we will follow, is to extend the programming lan-
guage with primitives for scheduling, as e.g. in [13, 29]. In this approach,
scheduling policies are represented by a concurrent program that is type-checked
using the same rules as other concurrent programs. (Such a scenario of schedule-
carrying code has been pursued independently in the context of embedded sys-
tems [20].)
In this paper, we focus on possibilistic non-interference for a concurrent
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programming language L that features primitives for synchronization. The lan-
guage, which is inspired from earlier work by G. Boudol and I. Castellani [13],
features instructions to manipulate variables and arrays, sequential and paral-
lel composition, the latter equipped with an interleaving semantics, branching
statements and loops, as well as two constructs for scheduling and monitoring
programs:
• the first construct P[[ Q]] combines two processes: the controller P and the
controlled process Q: the intuitive semantics is that Q can only proceed,
i.e. make one step of execution, if P can also make one step of execution.
However, P is also allowed to proceed without Q making any step;
• the second construct when e do P is built from an expression e and a
process P: the intuitive semantics is that when e do P can only proceed if
e evaluates to true and if P can proceed to P’ , in which case when e do P
evaluates to when e do P’ . Moreover, if P is the terminated program
skip , then when e do P evaluates to skip .
The combination of these constructs is expressive enough to capture a variety
of standard schedulers such as round robin schedulers or schedulers that select
randomly a thread to execute.
One further issue with concurrency is the attacker model. While definitions
of non-interference in sequential settings can be concerned with an input/out-
put view of the program behavior, definitions of non-interference in concurrent
settings usually aim at guaranteeing that confidential data is protected through-
out the entire program execution, and are therefore based on suitable notions
of bisimulation. There are two basic motivations for adopting definitions of
non-interference based on bisimulation: first of all, one wants to prevent that
a malicious thread can observe the behavior of other threads and adapt its
behavior accordingly. Second, the termination behavior or timing behavior of
program fragments can lead to undesired information leakage, as illustrated by
the following example due to Smith and Volpano [47]. In this example, the
program is constituted of the following three threads:
γ : if PIN = 0 then tα := tt else tβ := tt
α : while tα 6= tt do skip ; r := 0
β : while tβ 6= tt do skip ; r := 1
where PIN, tα, tβ are high variables and r is a low variable. The parallel com-
position of the three threads is not secure, since the value of PIN is copied into
r through the control flow of the program.
Turning back to information flow type systems, enforcing non-interference for
concurrent programs is considerably more complex that enforcing non-interference
for sequential programs, in particular because the parallel composition of secure
programs may fail to be secure, as illustrated by the above example due to Smith
and Volpano [47] (indeed, each thread above is non-interfering and typable ac-
cording to the information flow type system of [49] for sequential languages).
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There are several possibilities to design a sound and compositional information
flow type system that rejects the above example. One first possibility, devel-
oped by Smith and Volpano in [47] is to deal with typing judgments of the form
` P . t where t is a lower bound to the assignments that can potentially
be performed by P, and to reject programs that contain a loop whose guard
depends on a high variable. Another possibility, advocated by G. Boudol and
I. Castellani [13] and adopted in this paper, is to consider a refined type system
that deals with typing judgments of the form ` P . t s where t is a lower
bound to the level of variables that can be assigned by P and s is an upper bound
on the levels of guards that occur in P, and to reject programs that perform a
low assignment after checking a high guard.
The main contribution of this paper is a machine-checked specification of an
information flow type system for the language L, and a machine-checked proof
of soundness for the type system; all the work is conducted using Isabelle [32],
a general purpose proof assistant that has been previously used successfully to
formalize mathematics and programming language theory. The type system is
inspired from the work of G. Boudol and I. Castellani [13], and its validity is
established using their tools and definitions, including various notions of bisim-
ulations. However, our formalization improves on the results of [13] in three
significant ways: first, we consider a more general language that features unre-
stricted sequential composition, whereas [13] requires that the first process of
a sequential composition is sequential. We allow an unrestricted use of con-
trolling and scheduling constructs, whereas [13] imposes a very specific shape
to concurrent thread systems. Second, our semantics of programs improves
on the semantics of [13] by providing a more complete set of reduction rules,
whereas [13] does not provide reduction rules for programs such as skip; skip or
skip || skip. As a result, we can achieve our third, and most significant improve-
ment over [13], namely to prove the soundness of our type system for a more
general language.
Finally, formal proofs can also facilitate modular proofs. Many proof as-
sistants, including Isabelle, offer support for modular developments, through
which additional insights might be achieved. For example, we have exploited
the locales facility of Isabelle to provide a modular proof of the language pre-
sented in [13], where they adopt a layered view of thread systems as a list
of threads (each thread being a guarded sequential program) controlled by a
parallel scheduler. We have also used locales to define various models of the
memory.
Our work contributes to the growing evidence that proof assistants can be
used to machine check research papers in programming language theory, and
shows in particular that proof assistants are mature for verifying state-of-the-
art type systems for information flow. Furthermore, our work shows that proof
assistants allow to discard convenient but unnecessary assumptions in proofs
(according to its authors, the assumption in [13] that the first process of a
sequential composition is sequential was only made to keep proofs manageable).
Perhaps less importantly, our work reveals a few minor imprecisions in the
definitions and proofs of [13].
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Contents of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an intro-
duction to Isabelle/HOL. Section 3 presents the programming language L, its
operational semantics, and illustrate its expressiveness by showing how common
schedulers can be programmed in L. Section 4 introduces the security condition
to be enforced, defines an information flow type system for this purpose, and
shows that the type system is sound in the sense that typable programs are
non-interfering. Section 5 discusses some benefits and difficulties of machine-
checking formalizations. Section 6 provides an example of a program that is
typable with our type system. We conclude in Section 7 with related work and
directions for further work.
This paper is an extended version of [10].
2 Modular formalization in Isabelle/HOL
Isabelle [32] is a generic interactive theorem prover which can be instantiated
with different object logics. Isabelle/HOL is the instance for Higher-Order
Logic.
In this section we present basic notions of Isabelle generally used for formal-
izing programming language theory and then give a brief introduction to the
use of locales and interpretations. Locales provide a logical mean of structuring
elements and proofs of a theory in modules. Interpretations allow us to formally
prove relationships among these modules.
In this work we have modularized in two directions:
• The first direction concerns the memory model. We have performed sev-
eral formalizations which differ on the degree of abstraction used to de-
fine the memory model. Sections 3 and 4 describe the formalization of
the proof of non-interference using an abstract memory model based on
lookup and update functions. In Section 6 we show an application of the
type system to prove non-interference for a concrete example. For this we
have used a concrete model of the memory where arrays are implemented
as lists in Isabelle and where evaluation of variables and expressions is
modeled as function evaluation. Passing from an abstract model to a
more concrete one ensuring the consistency of the transformation can be
formally done in Isabelle using locales and interpretations.
• The second direction consists in using modules to structure the program-
ming language in several layers. We have used locales to model sequential
programs, parallel programs and thread systems separately. We have then
identified conditions on the base languages which are necessary to estab-
lish non-interference for the top-level layer. Thus, any implementation of
the base languages can be accepted as long as these conditions are sat-
isfied. Locales act in this setting as a sort of interface for the different
levels. This formalization is further discussed in Section 4.4.
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In this paper we have tried to present the formalization such that a non-
expert in Isabelle is able to understand the notation without any problem. The
rest of this section can thus be skipped. It serves as an introduction to the
notation used in the actual Isabelle theories [35].
2.1 Basics
When formalizing a programming language in a theorem prover, one has to
decide between using a deep embedding, where first the (abstract) syntax is
represented via an inductive datatype and then a semantics is assigned to it, and
a shallow embedding, where a term in the language is essentially an abbreviation
of its semantics. Deep embeddings are useful when meta-theoretic reasoning
(usually by induction over the syntax) is required. Shallow embeddings on
the other hand, simplify reasoning about individual programs because one may
work directly with the semantics avoiding the extra syntactic level. We use a
combination of both styles that has become quite established. We formalize as
much as possible using a shallow embedding and use a deep embedding only
where needed in order to perform the meta-theoretic proofs we are interested
in.
The program syntax is defined in Isabelle/HOL via a datatype definition.
A free datatype is defined by listing its constructors together with their argu-
ment types, separated by ‘|’. Laws about datatypes, such as distinctness of
constructors, are automatically included in the simplification tactics for future
proofs. An induction principle, namely, structural induction over the construc-
tors of the datatype is also generated with each datatype declaration. To use it
in proofs it has to be explicitly invoked. Functions about datatypes are usually
defined by primitive recursion. They are introduced by the keyword primrec.
Constants are declared with consts followed by their name and type, sepa-
rated by ‘::’. Non-recursive definitions are declared by the keyword constdefs.
The introduced constant and its definition are separated by ‘≡’.
The operational semantics and type rules of commands are inductively de-
fined via a set of rules. Such inductively defined sets represent the least set
which is closed under the formation rules. From each inductive definition Is-
abelle generates the corresponding induction principle, called rule induction,
which represents the most powerful proof method used in this work. The so-
called inductive cases proof principle is also automatically generated by the
system for any inductive definition. It can be understood as the counterpart
of (structural) case distinction on inductively generated elements. Whenever
we have an assumption stating that an element belongs to an inductively de-
fined set, we can distinguish on the last rule used for its derivation. When we
speak of case analysis on an inductively generated element we refer to this proof
principle.
Statements that we want to prove are preceded by theorem or lemma.
There is no formal difference between them; we use one or the other depending
on the importance we attach to the stated proposition. Proofs are done by
applying tactics to the stated goals. The basic tactics are based on resolution,
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i.e. by applying inference rules (backwards or forwards) in a natural deduction
style, and rewriting, i.e. by applying (conditional) directed equalities. As a
result, goals are reduced to simpler subgoals until they become trivial. When
all subgoals are solved the proposition is proven and stored under some name
given by the user.
Some tactics are based on natural deduction (forward and back-chaining of
rules) where search with backtracking is automated using the so-called classi-
cal reasoner. Other tactics, called simplifiers, compose rewriting steps. More
powerful tactics (like auto) combine both systems and are able to automatically
prove complicated goals.
In an interactive theorem prover like Isabelle, if a statement cannot be proved
automatically, the user is able to direct the proof by explicitly using induction,
case distinction, instantiating variables, etc. Very often, automatic tools do
succeed if they are supplied with suitable lemmas obtained from the Isabelle
library or previously proven by the user.
We use typedecl to declare types without defining them. Type abbrevia-
tions in Isabelle are declared by the keyword types. They follow the syntax
of ML, except that function types are denoted by ⇒. The formalization uses
some types and constants defined in the standard Isabelle/HOL library. In this
paper we use two base types (bool and nat) and construct others using type
constructors like list, set or the product type (×) or function type (⇒).
2.2 Locales and Interpretations
Locales are an extension of Isabelle which provide support for modular reason-
ing. The use of locales provides a structured way of stating and managing facts
but does not modify the language for proofs. In this section we introduce only
those aspects of locales which are useful for our purposes. For a more complete
description see [5].
A named locale is declared with the keyword locale followed by a name.
Locales are (internally) lists of context elements. These are of four kinds, iden-
tified by the keywords fixes , assumes , defines and notes . Parameters of
a locale correspond to the context element fixes , and assumptions may be
declared with assumes . The following is a simple locale named loc_ M which
simply fixes a parameter eqmem with infix syntax and assumes that it is an
equivalence relation.
typedecl M
locale loc_ M =
fixes eqmem :: M ⇒ M ⇒ bool (_ ' _)
assumes eqmem_refl: µ ' µ
and eqmem_sym: µ ' µ′ =⇒ µ′ ' µ
and eqmem_trans: µ ' µ′ ∧ µ′ ' µ′′ =⇒ µ ' µ′′
The context element defines adds a definition of the form p x1 . . . xn ≡ t
as an assumption, where p is a parameter of the locale and t a term that may
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contain the xi. It is possible to add facts to a locale and to export facts from
it. The difference between assumes and defines concerns the way parameters
are treated on export. This feature is, however, not relevant for our case study.
Adding facts, which must be theorems, to a locale is done by using notes .
Locales can be combined. The locale expresion e1 + e2 denotes the locale
obtained by merging the locales e1 and e2. This locale contains the context
elements of e1 followed by the context elements of e2.
Locale expressions may be instantiated. This requires a proof of the instan-
tiated specification and is called locale interpretation. There are various ways
of interpreting locales. We use the form interpretation loc1 ⊆loc2 which
interprets loc2 in loc1 and requires a proof that the specification of loc1 im-
plies the specification of loc2 . More details about locales instantiation and
interpretation can be found in [33].
3 The programming language
3.1 Language definition
The definition of processes is parameterized by four types: a type V of vari-
ables, a type T of array variables, a type A of arithmetic expressions, and a
type B of boolean expressions. These types are introduced at the onset of the
formalization with the following declarations:
typedecl V
typedecl T
typedecl A
typedecl B
In our formalization, parameterization is understood as a dependence relation
and amounts to declaring variables and expressions before declaring the type
of processes. Processes are defined inductively via a datatype definition with
nine constructors. Enclosed in parentheses we give the concrete syntax for each
one. We use ":==" for assignments and ";;" for sequential composition to
avoid clashes with the predefined ":=" and ";" of Isabelle.
datatype P =
Skip ( skip )
| Assign V A ( _ :== _ )
| Aassign T A A ( _ [_]:==_ )
| Seq P P ( _ ;; _ )
| Cond B P P ( if _ then _ else _ )
| While B P ( while _ do _ )
| Par P P ( _ ‖ _ )
| When B P ( when _ do _ )
| Control P P ( _ [[ _ ]])
Defining processes as a datatype allows us to reason about properties of pro-
cesses using an induction principle on the structure of processes. Such an in-
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duction principle is used extensively in our proofs.
In [13], processes are introduced in three successive layers: sequential pro-
cesses, concurrent processes, and thread systems. While the language of [13] is
strictly more restrictive than ours, e.g. because it does not consider processes
of the form (P ‖ Q);; R , it is possible to recover the three families of processes
with appropriate predicates. For example, the predicate issqtl is defined as
the following recursive function in Isabelle:
consts
issqtl :: P ⇒ bool
primrec
issqtl ( skip ) = True
issqtl (x:== a) = True
issqtl (y[e]:== a) = True
issqtl (P;; Q) = (issqtl P ∧ issqtl Q)
issqtl ( if b then P else Q) = (issqtl P ∧ issqtl Q)
issqtl ( while b do P) = issqtl P
issqtl (P ‖ Q) = False
issqtl ( when b do P) = False
issqtl (P [[Q]]) = False
Sequential processes enjoy a stronger security property than arbitrary processes,
as shown in Section 4.4.
3.2 Operational semantics
The operational semantics of processes is defined relative to the definition of
processes and to a memory model. For the memory we use an abstract model
based on lookup and update functions with the usual properties.
typedecl M
consts V_lookup:: M ⇒ V ⇒ nat
consts T_lookup:: M ⇒ T ⇒ nat ⇒ nat
consts V_update:: M ⇒ V ⇒ nat ⇒ M
consts T_update:: M ⇒ T ⇒ nat ⇒ nat ⇒ M
Evaluation of arithmetic and boolean expressions is defined via functions that
take as input a memory and return a natural number (for arithmetic expressions)
or a boolean (for boolean expressions).
consts EA :: M ⇒ A ⇒ nat
consts EB :: M ⇒ B ⇒ bool
We define an abstract function that returns the size of an array variable.
consts T_size:: M ⇒ T ⇒ nat
Before proceeding with the formal definition, we briefly comment on some hid-
den assumptions of our memory model w.r.t. the operational semantics of ex-
pressions: modeling expressions as total functions implicitly carries three im-
portant facts: first of all, expressions can always be evaluated (termination)
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and will always return a result (no exception). Furthermore, evaluating an ex-
pression will always return a single result (determinacy). The first and third
assumptions are already present in [13, 47]; the second assumption already ap-
pears in [15] where it is assumed that array lookups never raise an exception
and return an arbitrary value if the lookup is performed at an index that is out
of bounds.
The operational semantics of processes is defined inductively via transition
rules between configurations. A configuration is a pair of the form (P, µ) . For
clarity, we declare the following type abbreviation for configurations:
types C = P × M
We use a readable infix syntax for transition rules (most of the definitions pre-
sented in this paper are endowed with a readable infix syntax whose formal
declaration is not always explicitly shown here). The transition rules are shown
in Figure 1.
In the first rule for the control construct (Control1), the controlling command
and the controlled command may each have altered memory. Thus, the effect of
the composite command must combine these alterations. The merge function
is an auxiliary that describes how these effects are to be merged.
consts merge_mem :: M ⇒ M ⇒ M ⇒ M ( t )
Some properties about the merging of memories are needed in the proofs. We
state them as axioms. The following one concerns the evaluation of the size of
an array in a merged memory:
axioms T_size_merge:
T_size µ y = T_size µ′ y ∧ T_size µ′ y = T_size µ′′ y
=⇒ T_size µ y = T_size ( µ′ tµ µ′′ ) y
Three more axioms concerning memory merging are stated in Section 4.1. These
are the only four axioms governing merge. It is worth to notice how little these
axioms really require. In Section 6 we give an implementation of the merging
function that satisfies these four properties.
The rules for arrays are similar to the rules of [15]. There are two cases:
either the array assignment is performed within the bounds of the array, in
which case the update is performed in the usual way, or it is performed outside
the bounds of the array, in which case it has no effect and leaves the memory
unchanged.
Concentrating on the fragment of the language without arrays, observe that
there are several differences with respect to [13]. First of all, we have intro-
duced several rules for enabling reduction of processes that would be irreducible
otherwise, namely the rules ParLN, ParRN, WhenSkip, and ControlSkip. Fur-
thermore, the rule Seq1 for sequential composition has been modified to allow
reduction of processes of the form skip;;... ;; skip which were irreducible
when using the rule of [13]:
(P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′)
( skip;;P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′)
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Incidentally, this modification of the rule Seq1 also solves a minor flaw in the
proof of non-interference presented in [13].
Our operational semantics also differs from the one of [13] in its treatment of
scheduling constructs. Firstly, we do not require when processes whose guard
evaluates to true, and whose body is “stuck” to reduce to themselves in one
step, whereas [13] considers the rather unintuitive rule:
b µ stuck P
( when b do P, µ) −→1( when b do P, µ)
where stuck P is defined as ∀ Q ν. ¬(P, µ) −→1(Q, ν) .
Secondly, we allow the possibility of the controller to progress independently
of the controlled program, even though the latter is not “stuck”. One may argue
that this latter departure from [13] is undesirable because it allows for “unfair”
execution traces: for example the program x:==0;; P [[x:==1 ]] may terminate
with x being equal to 0. This departure from the operational semantics of [13] is
required for showing the soundness of the type system introduced in Section 4;
it is however possible to keep the rule of [13]
(P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′) stuck Q
(P [[ Q]], µ) −→1(P’ [[Q]], µ′)
at the price of modifying the typing rule for controlled processes.
In order to define the security condition and prove the soundness of the
information flow type sytem, one needs to introduce the reflexive closure and
reflexive transitive closure of −→1. Both are defined inductively and are denoted
respectively by −→0,1 and −→?.
4 Information flow type system
In this section, we introduce an information flow type system for our language
and show that it enforces a security condition based on bisimulation and inspired
from [13]. We also discuss soundness proofs for type systems that are closer
to [13], as well as a proof of a stronger security condition for sequential programs.
4.1 The security condition
The definition of non-interference presupposes a preordered set of security levels.
Furthermore, the security condition is defined relative to a downwards-closed
set of “low” security levels which we notate L. Formally, we declare a new
type level as an instance of the predefined axiomatic class quasi_order that
declares a binary relation v satisfying reflexivity and transitivity, and declare
a downwards-closed predicate over levels.
typedecl level
instance level :: quasi_order
11
Assign
(x :== a, µ) −→1( skip, V_update µ x ( EA µ a))
Array1
EA µ e=ε EA µ a=α ε < T _size µ y
(y[e] :== a, µ) −→1( skip, T _update µ y ε α)
Array2
T _size µ y ≤ EA µ e
(y[e] :== a, µ) −→1( skip, µ)
Seq1
( skip;; P, µ) −→1(P, µ)
Seq2
(P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′)
(P;; Q, µ) −→1(P’;; Q, µ′)
CondT
EB µ b
( if b then P else Q, µ) −→1(P, µ)
CondF
¬ EB µ b
( if b then P else Q, µ) −→1(Q, µ)
WhileT
EB µ b
( while b do P, µ) −→1(P;; while b do P, µ)
WhileF
¬ EB µ b
( while b do P, µ) −→1( skip, µ)
ParL
(P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′)
(P ‖ Q, µ) −→1(P’ ‖ Q, µ′)
ParLN
( skip ‖ Q, µ) −→1(Q, µ)
ParR
(Q, µ) −→1(Q’, µ′)
(P ‖ Q, µ) −→1(P ‖ Q’, µ′)
ParRN
(P ‖ skip, µ) −→1(P, µ)
When1
EB µ b (P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′)
( when b do P, µ) −→1( when b do P’, µ′)
WhenSkip
EB µ b
( when b do skip, µ) −→1( skip, µ)
Control1
(P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′) (Q, µ) −→1(Q’, µ′′)
(P [[Q]] , µ) −→1(P’ [[Q’ ]], µ′ tµ µ′′)
Control2
(P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′)
(P [[Q]], µ) −→1(P’ [[Q]], µ′)
ControlSkip
( skip[[Q]], µ) −→1( skip, µ)
Figure 1: Operational semantics
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consts L :: level ⇒ bool
axioms Ldown: L x’ ∧ x v x’ =⇒ L x
The definition of non-interference presupposes that levels are attached to vari-
ables: in the case of standard variables, one attaches a single security level,
whereas in the case of array variables we follow [15] and distinguish between
the security level of the array elements and of the array length. Formally, we
assume given functions:
consts Lv: V ⇒ level
consts Lt : T ⇒ (level × level)
The function Lt returns pairs of levels, the first one corresponding to the security
level of the array elements, and the second one corresponding to the security
level of the length of the array. In order to avoid information leakage for typable
programs, Deng and Smith [15] require that the length of the array is assigned
a security level that is lower than the security level of the array elements, which
is achieved by introducing the axiom:
axioms level_size_leq_contents: let ( Lt y)= (l 1 ,l 2 ) in l 2 v l 1
The above functions discriminate between variables that are visible by an
attacker that has access to the L-part of the memory. One fundamental ingre-
dient in the security condition is the definition of equality of memories, taken
from the point of view of the attacker; such an equality on memories is defined
relative to L, and is termed L-equality. For such a notion of equality, two mem-
ories are equal if they coincide on low variables. In the case of array variables,
the latter is to be understood as pointwise equality concerning the contents of
arrays for arrays with low content, and as equality on their length for arrays
whose length is tagged as low. Formally,
constdefs 'v :: M ⇒ M ⇒ bool
µ 'v µ′ ≡ ∀ x. L ( Lv x) =⇒ V_lookup µ x = V_lookup µ′ x
constdefs 't :: M ⇒ M ⇒ bool
µ 't µ′ ≡ let Lt y=(l 1 ,l 2 ) in
∀ y. L l 1 =⇒ T_lookup µ y = T_lookup µ′ y
∧ L l 2 =⇒ T_size µ y = T_size µ′ y
constdefs ' :: M ⇒ M ⇒ bool
µ ' µ′ ≡ µ 'v µ′ ∧ µ 't µ′
Three axioms involving equivalence of memories and merged memories as an-
nounced in Section 3.2 are needed in the proofs.
axioms
eqmem_merge1: µ ' ν ∧ µ′ ' ν′ ∧ µ′′ ' ν′′ =⇒ µ′ tµ µ′′ ' ν′ tν ν′′
eqmem_merge2: µ ' µ′ ∧ µ ' µ′′ =⇒ µ ' µ′ tµ µ′′
eqmem_merge3: ∀y. T_size µ y = T_size µ′ y ∧ µ ' µ′′
=⇒ µ′ tµ µ′′ ' µ′
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The predicate bisim defines when a relation R on configurations is a bisim-
ulation. This definition uses the notion of L-equality between memories.
constdefs bisim :: ( C ⇒ C ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool
bisim R ≡ ∀P µ Q ν. R (P, µ) (Q, ν) =⇒
R (Q, ν) (P, µ) ∧ µ ' ν ∧
( ∀P’ µ′ . (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ ) =⇒ ( ∃Q’ ν′ . (Q, ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ )
∧ R (P’, µ′ ) (Q’, ν′ )))
Observe that the definition implies that the relation R is symmetric.
Given a relation as a set of pairs of programs we define a function that
returns the corresponding relation (as a predicate) between configurations.
constdefs p2c :: ( P × P) set ⇒ ( C ⇒ C ⇒ bool)
p2c S ≡ ( λ (P, µ) (Q, ν). (P, Q) ∈ S ∧ µ ' ν)
The domain of bisimulations characterizes secure programs.
constdefs secure :: P ⇒ bool
secure P ≡ ∃S. bisim (p2c S) ∧ (P, P) ∈ S
4.2 Type system
Type judgments are defined relative to a context Γ which provides information
about the security level of program variables, and are of the form ` P . t s ,
where:
• t is a lower bound on the level of the assigned variables of P;
• s is the guard type, i.e. an upper bound on the level of the loop and
conditional guards occurring in P.
The following subsumption rule
` P . t s
t’ v t s v s’
` P . t’ s’
is a valid derived rule in our system.
The type system is parameterized by functions that provide the security
levels of variables and arrays (already required to formulate the security condi-
tion) and functions La and Lb that provide the security level of arithmetic and
boolean expressions, respectively.
consts La :: A ⇒ level
Lb :: B ⇒ level
In the sequel we assume that the security level of expressions is correct in the
sense that evaluating a low expression with low equal memories should yield
the same result. Such an assumption corresponds to [13, Assumption 3.3.] and
is formalized by the following axioms about the behaviour of arithmetic and
boolean expressions:
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axioms
beh_A: µ ' µ′ ∧ L ( La a) =⇒ ( EA µ a)=( EA µ′ a)
beh_B: µ ' µ′ ∧ L ( Lb b) =⇒ ( EB µ b)=( EB µ′ b)
Formally, the type system is defined inductively using inference rules. The set
of rules is shown in Figure 2. We say that a program is typable if there exist
types such that a typing judgment can be derived in the type system.
constdefs typable :: P ⇒ bool
typable P ≡ ∃t s. ` P . t s
We found it convenient to use a syntax-directed set of rules, i.e. a set of rules in
which there is only one rule applicable for any construct. The main advantages
of syntax-directedness are to avoid the use of the meet and join operators as
well as dealing with the subsumption rule.
In order to achieve syntax-directedness, one must avoid rules that can be
applied to different constructs, such as the subsumption rule shown above, that
apply at any point in the derivation, and “include” the effects of such rules in
the rules attached to a specific construct by including the necessary subtyping
relations in those rules.
Our type system coincides with the type system of [13] for its concurrent
fragment, but adopts quite different rules for the scheduling constructs Control
and When. In fact, our typing rules from Control and When are identical to the
typing rules for Seq and Cond whereas the typing rules of [13] require:
When
` P . t s
Lb b v s’ Lb b v t t’ v t
` when b do P . t’ s’
Control
` P . t s ` Q . t s
s v t t’ v t s v s’
` P[[Q]] . t’ s’
These rules do not reflect the intuitive interpretation of the typing judgments,
namely that ` P . t s implies that t is a lower bound to the level of variables
that can be assigned by P and that s is an upper bound on the levels of guards
that occur in P. Furthermore, the rule for When is unsound if applied to our
extended syntax, as illustrated by the program P below, where e and z are low,
and y is high:
when e do (when y do skip ) ;; z:==1
The rules of [13] allow us to derive ` P . low low , whereas the program is
insecure. Note that, in contrast to [13], the earlier paper [12] uses the same rule
as ours.
The typing rule for assignments to arrays imposes that both the security
level of the indexing expression and the security level of the array’s length be
bounded by the security level of guards. This might be surprising since, at first
sight, assignments to arrays are neither a conditional nor a loop instruction.
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However, by observing the operational semantics of assignments to arrays we
notice that an assignment of the form y[e]:==a behaves exactly like the guarded
command
if EA µ e < T_size µ y then y[e]:==a else skip
Thus, these conditions on the security levels of the indexing expression and of
the length of an array correspond to the condition in the typing rule Cond, which
imposes that the security level of guards must be an upper bound of the security
level of the boolean expression. Intuitively, the security level of a boolean (or
arithmetic) expression should be un upper bound of the security levels of its
components. The rule for array assignment is concerned with a particular case
of boolean expression.
4.3 Soundness
In this section we formally define and prove some properties of typable pro-
grams. The first property, subject reduction, states that types are preserved
along execution.
lemma subject_reduction:
` P . t s ∧ (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ ) =⇒ ` P’ . t s
The proof is by rule induction on the typing judgment ` P . t s .
We define the relation Q is a derivative of P, written P ; Q, as the least
set closed under the following rules:
der_refl: P ; P
der_step: (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ ) ∧ P’ ; Q =⇒ P ; Q
Using this definition we define (semantically) high programs. A program is
semantically high if none of its derivatives can cause a low-visible change in any
state.
constdefs SH :: P ⇒ bool
SH P ≡ ∀P’ µ Q µ′ . (P ; P’ ∧ (P’, µ) −→1 (Q, µ′ )) =⇒ µ ' µ′
From this definition we prove the lemma
lemma SH_sr: (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ ) ∧ SH P =⇒SH P’
and from this the following lemma is straightforward.
lemma SH_sr_der: P ; P’ ∧ SH P =⇒SH P’
Let us mention that this definition of semantically high programs is a cor-
rection of the one given in [13]. The problem comes from the definition of
derivative. In [13], Q is defined as a derivative of P , if for some µ and µ′ we
have (P, µ) −→?(Q, µ′) , where −→? is the reflexive and transitive closure
of −→1. This definition does not allow for arbitrary changes of the memory
throughout the execution and thus the lemma SH_sr_der cannot be proved.
However, using our definition of derivative, any program Q that can be ob-
tained by reducing P via the operational semantics, allowing arbitrary changes
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Skip
` skip . t s
Assign
La a v Lv x t v Lv x
` x:==a . t s
Array
Lt y = ( τ1, τ2) t vτ1 La e v τ1 La a v τ1
La e v s τ2 v s
` y[e]:==a . t s
Seq
` P . t s ` Q . t’ s’
s v t’ t’’ v t t’’ v t’ s v s’’ s’ v s’’
` P ;; Q . t’’ s’’
Cond
` P . t s ` Q . t s
Lb b v t Lb b v s’ s v s’ t’ v t
` if b then P else Q . t’ s’
While
` P . t s
Lb b v t s v t Lb b v s’ s v s’ t’ v t
` while b do P . t’ s’
Par
` P . t s ` Q . t s
` P ‖ Q . t s
When
` P . t s
Lb b v t Lb b v s’ s v s’ t’ v t
` when b do P . t’ s’
Control
` P . t s ` Q . t’ s’
s v t’ t’’ v t t’’ v t’ s v s’’ s’ v s’’
` P[[Q]] . t’’ s’’
Figure 2: Typing rules
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in the memory throughout the reduction, is a derivative of P . This gives us the
right definition of semantically high programs.
Matos et al. [29] give another corrected version of the definition which is
equivalent to ours. They define semantically high programs coinductively as
the greatest formula such that
SH P =⇒ ( ∀µ. (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ ) =⇒ µ ' µ′ ∧ SH P’)
The following are several lemmas about semantically high programs which are
needed in the soundness proof:
lemma SH_skip: SH skip
lemma SH_seq: SH P ∧ SH Q =⇒ SH (P;;Q)
lemma SH_par: SH P ∧ SH Q =⇒ SH (P ‖ Q)
lemma SH_when: SH P =⇒ SH (when b do P)
lemma SH_control: SH P ∧ SH Q =⇒ SH (P [[Q]])
A program P is bounded if the infimum of the levels of variables assigned in it is
L.
constdefs bnd :: P ⇒ bool
bnd P ≡ ∀t s. ` P . t s =⇒ L t
And we prove the following property of bounded programs:
lemma bnd_seq: bnd Q =⇒ bnd (P;;Q)
We also define the complementary notion of nonbounded which is often used:
constdefs
notbnd :: P ⇒ bool
notbnd P ≡ ∃t s. ` P . t s ∧ ¬ ( L t)
Nonboundedness is subterm closed:
lemma nb_seq: notbnd(P;;Q) =⇒ notbnd Q ∧ notbnd P
lemma nb_if: notbnd( if b then P else Q) =⇒ notbnd P ∧ notbnd Q
lemma nb_while: notbnd( while b do P) =⇒ notbnd P
lemma nb_par: notbnd(P ‖ Q) =⇒ notbnd P ∧ notbnd Q
lemma nb_when: notbnd( when b do P) =⇒ notbnd P
lemma nb_control: notbnd(P [[T ]]) =⇒ notbnd P ∧ notbnd T
All these lemmas are automatically proven by the Isabelle auto tactic considering
that the pool of rules used by auto has been previously fed with introduction
rules and with elimination rules for case analysis on the operational semantics
and on the typing rules.
A program which is notbounded cannot write on variables of low level, and
therefore such a program is high.
lemma nb_SH : notbnd P =⇒SH P
However, a high program is not necessarily notbounded (see counterexample in
[13]). We now define guarded programs. A program is guarded if the supremum
of variables it reads is low.
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constdefs guarded :: P ⇒ bool
guarded P ≡ ∃t s. ` P . t s ∧ ( L s)
As a consequence of subject reduction, both nonboundedness and guardedness
are preserved by execution.
lemma nb_sr: notbnd P ∧ (P, µ) −→1 (Q, ν) =⇒ notbnd Q
lemma guarded_sr: guarded P ∧ (P, µ) −→1 (Q, ν) =⇒ guarded Q
The next is an important lemma that characterizes the behaviour of guarded
programs.
lemma behaviour_of_guarded_programs:
guarded P ∧ µ ' ν ∧ (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ )
=⇒ ∃ ν′ . (P, ν) −→1 (P’, ν′ ) ∧ µ′ ' ν′
Proof. By structural induction on P. We examine the case of arrays which will
help us to clarify the intuition behind the typing rule.
` y[e]:==a . t s ∧ L s ∧ µ ' ν ∧ (y[e]:==a, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ )
=⇒ ∃ ν′ . (y[e] :== a, ν) −→1 (P’, ν′ ) ∧ µ′ ' ν′
By case analysis on the transition (y[e]:==a, µ) −→1(P’, µ′) we obtain two
cases. We detail the case where the transition is proved by means of Array1.
For clarity, let µ=( µ1, µ2) , ν=( ν1, ν2) and Lt y=( τ1, τ2) . Then, we have:
L s ∧ µ ' ν ∧ EA µ e < T_size µ2 y ∧ t v τ1
∧ La e v τ1 ∧ La a v τ1 ∧ La e v s ∧ τ2 v s
=⇒ ∃ ν′ . (y[e]:==a, ν) −→1 ( skip , ν′ )
∧ T_update µ y ( EA µ e) ( EA µ a) ' ν′
We instantiate the quantified ν′ in the conclusion by unifying with the Ar-
ray1 rule. For this we have to prove that EA ν e < T _size ν2 y . Notice
that the typing rule of arrays requires the upper bound of guards be un up-
per bound of the security level of the indexing expression and of the array’s
length: La e v s ∧ τ2 v s . From this and using axioms Ldown and beh_ A
we obtain EA µ e = EA ν e, and by definition of equivalence of memories of
arrays, we have T _size µ2 y = T _size ν2 y . The proofs of the other cases
are fairly automatic using Isabelle. 2
Following [13] we prove bisimilarity of high programs using the relation S0.
constdefs S0 :: ( P × P) set
S0 ≡ {(P, Q). SH P ∧ SH Q}
theorem S0_is_bisim: bisim (p2c S0)
The proof follows easily from lemma SH_sr .
In order to prove non-interference for our type system we define a relation
called S between programs and prove that it, or rather p2c S is a bisimulation.
Due to our generalization of the language, where we only have one syntactical
level, a single relationship, that is S , suffices (see section 4.4). The relation S
is inductively defined by the rules of Figure 3.
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cl1
SHP SHQ typable P typable Q
P S Q
cl2
bnd P typable P
P S P
cl3
P S Q notbnd R typable (P;;R) typable(Q;;R)
(P;;R) S (Q;;R)
cl4
P1 S P2 Q1 S Q2 typable(P1 ‖Q1) typable(P2 ‖Q2)
(P1 ‖ Q1) S (P2 ‖Q2)
cl4s
P1 S Q2 Q1 S P2 typable(P1 ‖Q1) typable(P2 ‖Q2)
(P1 ‖ Q1) S (P2 ‖Q2)
cl5
SHP Q1 S Q2 typable Q1 typable(P ‖Q2)
Q1 S (P ‖ Q2)
cl5s
SHP Q1 S Q2 typable Q1 typable(P ‖Q2)
Q1 S (Q2 ‖ P)
cl6
SHP Q1 S Q2 typable Q2 typable(P ‖Q1)
(P ‖ Q1) S Q2
cl6s
SHP Q1 S Q2 typable Q2 typable(P ‖Q1)
(Q1 ‖ P) S Q2
cl7
L ( Lb b) P S Q typable( when b do P) typable( when b do Q)
( when b do P) S ( when b do Q)
cl8
guarded P Q S R typable(P [[Q]]) typable(P [[R]])
(P [[Q]]) S (P [[R]])
cl9
SHQ SHR P S P’ typable(P [[Q]]) typable(P’ [[R]])
(P [[Q]]) S (P’ [[R]])
Figure 3: Relation S
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The original set of rules presented in [13] to prove noninterference for con-
current programs consisted of clauses cl1, cl2, cl3 and cl4. We first added cl4s,
cl5, cl5s, cl6 and cl6s in order to prove the result for concurrent programs where
the operational semantics included the rules ParLN and ParRN, providing for
reduction of programs such as skip ‖ skip. And clauses cl7, cl8 and cl9 for the
extension with Whenand Control .
We prove three useful properties of the relation S . Using rule induction we
prove that it is symmetric.
lemma S _sym: P S Q =⇒ Q S P
The second property
lemma S _refl: typable P =⇒ P S P
is proved by distinguishing the case where P is bounded, in which case we apply
cl2, or not, in which case SH P by lemma nb_SH and thus P S P by clause cl1.
The third property is proven using rule induction.
lemma S _skip_ SH : skip S P =⇒SH P
Let us finally state the main result of this development saying that typable
programs are secure in the sense of non-interference.
theorem Noninterference: typable P =⇒ secure P
Unfolding the definition of secure programs and instantiating with the relation
S we obtain the following subgoals:
1. typable P =⇒ bisim (p2c S )
2. typable P =⇒ P S P
The second subgoal is solved using lemma S _refl . For the first subgoal we
prove that the relation p2c S, the extended relation on S for configurations, is
a bisimulation.
lemma S _is_bisim: bisim (p2c S )
The proof is by induction on the derivation of S by means of the following
auxiliary lemma:
lemma S _is_bisim_aux: P S P’ =⇒
∀µ ν Q µ′ . µ ' ν =⇒ (P, µ) −→1 (Q, µ′ )
=⇒ ( ∃Q’ ν′ . (P’, ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ Q S Q’ ∧ µ′ ' ν′ )
The case of clause cl1 implies that both SHP and SHQ and the proof is trivial.
For the rest of the proof we can assume that P and Qare not both high programs.
We examine the case for clause cl2.
lemma S _clause2:
∀µ ν Q µ′ . bnd P =⇒ typable P =⇒ µ ' ν =⇒ (P, µ) −→1 (Q, µ′ )
=⇒ ( ∃Q’ ν′ . (P, ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ Q S Q’ ∧ µ′ ' ν′ )
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of P. We present the proof
of the most significant cases: assignment to arrays, sequential composition and
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control.
(Assignment to arrays)
bnd (y[e]:==a) ∧ typable (y[e]:==a) ∧ µ ' ν
∧ (y[e]:==a, µ) −→1 (Q, µ′ )
=⇒ ∃Q’ ν′ . (y[e]:==a, ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ Q S Q’ ∧ µ′ ' ν′
We distinguish two cases, according to which of the rules Array1 or Array2 is
used to deduce the transition (y[e]:==a, µ) −→1(Q, µ′) . Both cases are
very similar so we only detail the case where the transition is proved by means
of Array1. Let µ=( µ1, µ2) and µ′=( µ′1, µ′2) , then we obtain
bnd (y[e]:==a) ∧ typable (y[e]:==a)
∧ µ ' ν ∧ EA µ e < T_size µ y
=⇒ ∃Q’ ν′ . (y[e]:==a, ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ )
∧ skip S Q’ ∧ T_update µ y ( EA µ e) ( EA µ a) ' ν′
There are two possibilities. Let Lt y be ( τ1, τ2) , then
1. if L τ1, we instantiate in the conclusion with the configuration ( skip, ν)
where ν=T _update ν y ( EA ν e) ( EA ν a) so that we can resolve the
first conjunct with the rule Array1. To apply this rule we need to prove
that the condition EA ν e < T _size ν y holds. From typable P and
case analysis on the typing rules we obtain La e v τ1. Since L τ1 we have
EA µ e = EA ν e using axioms beh_ A and Ldown. By the definition
of 't we obtain L τ2 =⇒T _size µ y = T _size ν y . Using the axioms
Ldown and level_size_leq_contents , we obtain L τ2. That skip S skip
is proved by cl1 and the proof of the equivalence of memories is easy.
2. If ¬ L τ1, we instantiate in the conclusion with the program y[e]:==a and
the memory ν, so that the first conjunct is proven by reflexivity of −→0,1.
We prove skip S y[e]:==a by clause cl1 since SH skip. From ¬ L τ1 we
prove SH(y[e]:==a)
(Seq) We assume IH P and IH Q being the induction hypothesis for P and Q,
respectively. Then we have
bnd(P;;Q) ∧ typable(P;;Q) ∧ µ ' ν ∧ (P;;Q, µ) −→1 (R, µ′ )
=⇒ ∃Q’ ν′ . (P;;Q, ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ R S Q’ ∧ µ′ ' ν′
By rule inversion on the transition (P;;Q, µ) −→1(R, µ′) we obtain two cases:
1. If the transition is solved by Seq1 we have P=skip. The required transi-
tion is ( skip;;Q, ν) −→0,1(Q, ν) solved by Seq1; Q S Q is resolved by
S _refl since trivially typable( skip;;Q) implies typable Q and µ 'ν is
among the assumptions.
2. If the transition is solved by Seq2 we have
bnd(P;;Q) ∧ typable(P;;Q) ∧ µ ' ν ∧ (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ )
=⇒ ∃Q’ ν′ . (P;;Q, ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ (P’;;Q) S Q’ ∧ µ′ ' ν′
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There are two possibilities:
(a) First we consider bnd Q. Since P;;Q is typable we have ` P . t s ,
` Q . t’ s’ with s v t’ . If Q is bounded then L t’ and by
Ldown we have L s . Thus P is guarded. By the lemma about the
behaviour of guarded programs we have (P, ν) −→1(P’, ν′) with
µ′ 'ν′ for some ν′. The required transition in the conclusion goes
to (P’;;Q, ν′) and we prove (P’;;Q) S(P’;;Q) by cl2 and the
following lemma
lemma bnd_seq: bnd Q =⇒ bnd (P;;Q)
which is a trivial consequence of the type system.
(b) If notbnd Q then we have SH Q. Since we have ¬ SH(P;;Q) (oth-
erwise we fall into clause 1) we obtain ¬ SH P using lemma SH_seq
and thus bnd P by notbnd_ SH again. Using the induction hypothesis
for P we obtain (P, ν) −→0,1(Q’, ν′) ∧ P’ S Q’ ∧ µ′'ν′. The
result follows using the rule Seq2 and clause cl3.
(Control) We assume IH P and IH Q being the induction hypothesis for P and
Q, respectively. Then we have
bnd(P [[Q]]) ∧ typable(P [[Q]]) ∧ µ ' ν ∧ (P [[Q]] , µ) −→1 (R, µ′ )
=⇒ ∃Q’ ν′ . (P [[Q]] , ν) −→0,1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ R S Q’ ∧ µ′ ' ν′
By case analysis on the transition (P [[Q]], µ) −→1(R, µ′) we distinguish three
cases. We just show the proof for the case where the transition is proved by
means of Control1. The cases for Control2 and ControlSkip present no further
difficulties.
We have then (P, µ) −→1(P’, µa) and (Q, µ) −→1(Q’, µ′′) among the
premises. The conclusion becomes
∃R’ ν′ . (P [[Q]] , µ′ ) −→0,1 (R’, ν′ ) ∧ P’ [[Q’ ]] S R’ ∧ µa tµ µ′′ ' ν′
We distinguish two cases:
1. If bnd Q holds then we can prove guarded P as in the case for sequential
composition. Thus by lemma behaviour_of_guarded_programs we ob-
tain for some ν′ that (P, ν) −→1(P’, ν′) and µa 'ν′. By the induction
hypothesis we obtain (Q, ν) −→0,1(R’, ν′′) and Q’ S R’ ∧ µ′′ 'ν′′.
We distinguish whether (Q, ν) −→0,1(Q, ν) or (Q, ν) −→1(R’, ν′′) .
In the first case we solve the conclusion by using rule Control2. The sub-
goal P’ [[Q’ ]]S P’ [[Q]] is proved by clause cl8. To prove µa tµ µ′′ 'ν′ we use
symmetry and transitivity of ' combined with the assumption µa 'ν′ and
obtain µa tµ µ′′ 'µa. This is true if the lengths of arrays are preserved
along the execution, which is easily proven by induction on the operational
semantics.
The second case is solved with rule Control1 and then using again cl8.
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2. If we have notbnd Q then SH Q and since ¬ SH(P [[Q]]) (otherwise we
fall into clause 1) we obtain ¬ SH P using lemma SH_control and thus
bnd P. Then, by induction hypothesis we have for some R’ that
(P’, ν) −→0,1 (R’, ν′ ) ∧ P’ S R’ ∧ µa ' ν′
By case analysis on (P’, ν) −→0,1(R’, ν′) we obtain two cases. The
reflexive case is solved by reflexivity in the transition of the conclusion.
The subgoal P’ [[Q’ ]]S P[[Q]] can be proved with clause cl9. The second case
is solved with rule Control2 and then using cl9.
The proof of the other clauses are relatively easy and fairly automatic with
Isabelle. 2
4.4 Layered view of thread systems
In the case of the original layered language of [13], one can give a modular
proof using the ’locales’ mechanism of Isabelle. In [13] thread systems are
viewed as list of threads controlled by a parallel scheduler, each thread being a
guarded sequential program. We have defined a locale for sequential programs
and another one for parallel programs. These two locales have as parameters:
• a set of programs (defined as a type parameter), a partial order of security
level (defined as an abstract partial order), an abstract class of memory
(defined as a type parameter) with an equivalence relation as defined in
Section 2.2, an operational semantics (depending on the memory, and
defined as a parameter from configurations to configurations to booleans),
and a type system (defined as a parameter of programs to a pair of security
levels to booleans), from which the type system and operational semantics
of thread systems can be defined;
• axioms that are sufficient to guarantee non-interference for typable thread
systems.
– For sequential programs we have identified seven axioms. The first
three of them concern the typing system and the operational seman-
tics. The remaining four assumptions are properties about a relation
S1 between sequential programs, which is also a parameter of the
locale.
1. ` P . t s ∧ (P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′) =⇒ ` P’ . t s
2. notbnd P ∧(P, µ) −→1(P’, µ′) =⇒ µ'µ′
3. ¬ ( ∃ c. (P, µ) −→1c) =⇒¬( ∃c. (P, ν) −→1c)
4. P S1 Q =⇒ Q S1 P
5. SHP ∧ SHQ ∧ typable P ∧ typable Q =⇒ P S1 Q
6. bound P ∧ typable P =⇒ P S1 P
7. The last axiom states that the relation S1 (more concretely, its
extended relation R1 to configurations) is a particular form of
bisimulation called quasi-strong bisimulation:
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P S1 P’ =⇒ ∀µµ′ Qν. µ ' µ′ =⇒ (P, µ) −→1 (Q, ν) =⇒
( ∃ Q’ ν′ . (P’, µ’) −→1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ Q S1 Q’ ∧ ν ' ν′ )
∨ ( SH P ∧ SH P’)
– For parallel programs we need three axioms. The first two axioms
are analogous to the first two axioms of sequential programs, and
the third one is the property about behaviour of guarded programs
stated already in Section 4.3.
Thus, we can instantiate the result to other settings where sequential and
concurrent programs enjoy the properties upon which we build. We have carried
out the proofs with one particular instantiation. We have instantiated the mem-
ory as in the previous section, sequential programs as the sequential subset of
the language of Section 3 and, parallel programs as the sequential sublanguage
plus the parallel construct. This corresponds to the language considered in [13]
but with a sequential sublanguage that includes assignments to arrays.
It should be noted that the type system for the layered language is different
from the one presented in Section 4, and that the proof is not a mere reorgani-
zation of the proof of type soundness presented earlier. Indeed, in the layered
setting two stronger notions of bisimulation are used, namely quasi-strong and
strong bisimulations. The first one is needed to prove non-interference for the
sequential sublanguage. The second one is used to prove non-interference for
controlled thread systems.
The definition of a quasi-strong bisimulation is the following:
constdefs
quasi_strong_bisim :: ( Cs ⇒ Cs ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool
quasi_strong_bisim R ≡ ∀P µ Q ν.
R (P, µ) (Q, ν) =⇒ R (Q, ν) (P, µ) ∧ µ ' ν ∧
(( ∀P’ µ′ . (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ )
=⇒ ( ∃Q’ ν′ . (Q, ν) −→1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ R (P’, µ′ ) (Q’, ν′ )))
∨ ( SH P ∧ SH Q))
where Cs is the type of configurations for sequential programs. A relationship
between pure sequential programs, consisting of the first three clauses of the
relation S of Figure 3, is proved to be a quasi-strong bisimulation. This stronger
result is needed to establish that a third relationship between thread systems is
a strong bisimulation, where a strong bisimulation is defined like a bisimulation
but replacing −→0,1 by −→1.
constdefs
strong_bisim :: ( Cc ⇒ Cc ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool
strong_bisim R ≡ ∀P µ Q ν.
R (P, µ) (Q, ν) =⇒ R (Q, ν) (P, µ) ∧ µ ' ν ∧
( ∀P’ µ′ . (P, µ) −→1 (P’, µ′ )
=⇒ ( ∃Q’ ν′ . (Q, ν) −→1 (Q’, ν′ ) ∧ R (P’, µ′ ) (Q’, ν′ )))
where Cc is the type of configurations for controlled thread systems.
It is easy to prove that a strong bisimulation is also a quasi-strong bisimu-
lation:
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lemma sbisim_is_qsbisim: strong_bisim R =⇒ quasi_strong_bisim R
However, that a quasi-strong bisimulation is also a bisimulation is not true in
general. It holds for any relation R satisfying the following condition:
∀P Q µ ν. SH P =⇒SH Q =⇒ µ ' ν =⇒ R (P, µ) (Q, ν)
In order to prove the final result (i.e. typable controlled thread systems are
secure) we exhibit a strong bisimulation R such that R P P for all typable
controlled thread systems P .
We proceed as follows: first, we define a strong bisimulation S 3 on controlled
thread systems. Since this relation does not have the expected property, one
defines a quasi-strong bisimulation S 4 that extends S 3 and enjoys the property
that P S 4 P for all typable controlled thread systems P . Finally, we show that
S 4 is a strong bisimulation, by proving that S 4 satisfies the sufficient condition
for a quasi-strong bisimulation to be a strong bisimulation shown above. The
definitions of these relations and further details about the proofs can be found
in [13, 10, 35].
5 Discussion
The purpose of this section is to provide a high-level perspective on our formal-
izations, as well as some statistics on the Isabelle theories.
5.1 Benefits of machine-checked formalization
Machine-checked formalizations are particularly useful to rapidly detect poten-
tial difficulties in informal arguments: for example, the use of a proof assistant
was useful in the early stages of our project to unveil minor flaws in the def-
initions of [13]. Although not often emphasized, proof assistants are equally
useful when playing with variations of a result that was already proved for-
mally. Indeed, it is possible to test the “type system” by replaying the proof
script with a slightly modified semantics or type system can provide very con-
venient feedback. We fully took advantage of this “testing” facility offered by
proof assistants to extend the results of Boudol and Castellani to our setting.
Then, machine-checked formalizations can be turned into executable proto-
types at little cost. In the next section, we show how our formalization of the
type system can be used to type-check programs. It is also possible to use our
formalization of the operational semantics of the language to execute programs;
however, our formalization is hiding implementation details on purpose, and it
is necessary to provide implementations of the memory model in order to obtain
an executable semantics. The benefits of executable semantics are obvious in
the context of complex programming languages whose formalized semantics may
contain bugs (a point much emphasized in formalizations of Java Virtual Ma-
chines, see e.g. [9]), but also to show that the abstract treatment of the memory
model (or any other notion which has been formalized abstractly, e.g. the heap
in the formalization of the Java Virtual Machine) is realistic.
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5.2 Difficulties with machine-checked formalizations
The overall experience with the formalization is rather positive, but of course we
encountered some well-known difficulties with carrying the formal developments.
The first difficulty is the limited possibilities for proof reuse. Formal proofs
for programming languages are often carried incrementally, by considering in-
creasingly large fragments of the language, or even better, by treating distinct
fragments of the language in isolation. Unfortunately, such an incremental ap-
proach is not always possible, due to the possibility of undesirable interactions
between language features.
The situation is even worse in the context of machine-checked verification,
as there is no general mechanism to extend a proof of a property φ from one
fragment L of the language (described as a datatype with a given set of con-
structors) to a larger fragment L′ (described as a datatype with strictly more
constructors). Indeed,the current approach for proving φ for L′ is simply to run
again the script proving that φ for L, and complete it in appropriate places. Of
course, one drawback of this approach is that it makes proof scripts harder to
maintain, because changes have to be reproduced in several places. Thus an
important research topic in the field of proof assistants is to develop methods
for supporting proof reuse.
This said, enforcing non-interference is notoriously more difficult in presence
of concurrency or scheduling primitives, and it is unclear that one could pro-
vide a criterion on information flow type systems for sequential languages so
that their extension to a multi-threaded language with the parallel composition
allowed arbitrarily deep in programs enforces non-interference (which would be
a modularity result similar to the one which we achieved for the layered lan-
guage). Likewise, scheduling introduces so-called refinement attacks (i.e. a
non-interfering multi-threaded program might become insecure once a schedul-
ing policy is added to it), so that, as in the previous case, it is unclear that one
can provide a criterion on multi-threaded programs so that their extension to
a language with scheduling with scheduling allowed arbitrarily deep in programs
enforces non-interference.
The second difficulty is the lack of automation. One initial objective of
our work was to assess the extent to which proofs could be made automatic
through appropriate tactics. We feel that the level of automation is acceptable
for simple properties such as subject reduction, but more work is required for
proving statements that involve existential statements; e.g. in the proof that
S is a bisimulation, the user has to provide for each reduction step of the first
element in the bisimulation relation the matching step of the second element in
the relation. We believe that it is feasible, and useful, to develop heuristics that
help finding the matching move and showing its correctness in many cases.
5.3 Statistics
The theories and proof scripts (for the development presented in Sections 3, 4
and the example in 6) consist of approximately 2,500 lines of Isabelle, and are
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organized as follows:
• about 400 lines are concerned with the formal definition of the language,
syntax and operational semantics, and of the type system;
• about 100 lines with basic facts such as subject reduction or the subterm
closedness of typable terms;
• about 600 lines are concerned with properties of bound programs and
semantically high programs;
• about 1,000 lines are concerned with the formal definition of bisimulations,
the definition of S and the proof that S is a bisimulation.
• about 400 lines are concerned with the example.
The de Bruijn factor (i.e. the ratio of the length of formal definitions and proofs
by the length of their informal counterparts) is of the order of 5, which seems
very reasonable. Nevertheless, we believe that it is possible to achieve a greater
degree of automation, and therefore a better de Bruijn factor, by developing ded-
icated tools for proving type soundness and for establishing that a relation is
indeed a bisimulation. We believe that increasing proof automation is an essen-
tial ingredient for encouraging machine-checked formalizations of programming
language theories.
It is difficult to estimate the effort required to complete the formalization,
since a substantial part of the effort consisted in getting acquainted to the
formalisms and results of [13]. Our rough estimate is that it took us about 6
months to complete the formalization.
The full theories and proof scripts are available at:
http://www.loria.fr/ ∼prensa
and can be displayed with a notation similar to the one used in this paper using
ProofGeneral with the X-symbol option1.
6 Example
We illustrate the use of our type system by proving type correctness of a program
that uses parallelism, arrays and a scheduler.
6.1 An implementation of the memory model
In order to obtain an executable semantics we define a concrete model for the
memory by implementing the lookup and update functions. We use locales to
structure the different levels of abstraction of the memory. Locales allow us to
prove via the interpretation command that the concrete model is a refinement
of the abstract one.
1See http://proofgeneral.inf.ed.ac.uk/ .
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The locales facility is quite recent in Isabelle and is still under development.
Some features such as sharing of parameters have to be simulated by using a
predeclared locale called var which simply fixes one parameter. Also, inductive
definitions are not yet allowed in a locale declaration and have to be defined
outside the locale and imported afterwards. As a consequence, the presentation
with locales is unnecessarily complicated at present and will be improved in the
near future. Hence, we give here a readable description of the refinement. The
actual Isabelle formalization using locales can be found in [35].
The types of variables and array variables are left abstract as in Section 3.
Memories are now defined as pairs of functions that map variables to values, in
this case natural numbers, and array variables to arrays, which are modeled as
list of values.
types Mv = V ⇒ nat
types Mt = T ⇒ nat list
types M = Mv ×Mt
Expressions are defined as functions that take as input a memory and return a
natural number (for arithmetic expressions) or a boolean (for boolean expres-
sions).
types A = M ⇒ nat
types B = M ⇒ bool
Hence, evaluation of arithmetic and boolean expressions (formerly EA and EB)
becomes function evaluation. Such a modeling of expressions as functions is
known in the literature as a shallow embedding because it does not use an
inductive definition of expressions, in contrast to a deep embedding, which
does. In a shallow embedding, the constant n is modeled as the function
λ µ. n , whereas compound expressions such as e+e’ are modeled as the func-
tion λ µ. (E µ) + (E’ µ) , where E and E’ respectively denote the encoding
of e and e’ . The primary motivation for adopting a shallow embedding is the
abstract treatment of expressions found in most papers on information flow type
systems.
The definition of the lookup and update functions are:
V_lookup µ x ≡ (fst µ) x
V_update µ x ≡ ( λa. ((fst µ)[x 7→ a], snd µ))
T_lookup µ y ≡ ( λe. ((snd µ) y)!e)
T_update µ y ≡ ( λe a. (fst µ, (snd µ)[y[e] 7→ a]))
and rely on the following auxiliary definitions:
• fst and snd are the projection functions that come with the product type
α× β used to define the memory.
• update of simple variables uses the predefined update function µ[x 7→a] ,
where µ: V⇒nat , defined as λ z. if z=x then a else µ z ;
• lookup of the ith component of a list xs is written xs! i in Isabelle lists
notation.
29
• array update uses the function µ{y[e] 7→a} , where µ: T ⇒nat list ,
defined as
λ z. if z=y then y[e:=a] else µ z
where y[e:=a] is the list obtained from y by replacing the eth element
of y by a.
The definition of T _size is simply the length of the list:
T_size µ y ≡ length ((snd µ) y)
With these definitions we can easily prove the axioms about the lookup,
update and size functions stated in the previous sections. It remains to give an
implementation of the merge_mem function which satisfies the the four axioms
stated in Sections 3 and 4. It is defined as follows (we overload the symbol t):
(∗ merging va lues ∗)
v1 tv v2 = if v 6=v1 and v=v 2 then v 1
else if v 6=v2 and v=v 1 then v 2 else v
(∗ merging simple v a r i a b l e memories ∗)
µ′1 tµ′ µ′2 = λy. ( µ′1 y) tµ′y ( µ′2 y)
(∗ merging array memories ∗)
µ′′1 tµ′′ µ′′2 = λy. map ( λ (v, v 1 , v 2 ). v 1 tv v2 )
(zip ( µ′′ y) (zip ( µ′′1 y) ( µ
′′
2 y)))
(∗ merging memories ∗)
µ1 tµ µ2 = let µ = ( µ′ , µ′′), µ1 = ( µ′1 , µ′′1 ), µ2 = ( µ′2 , µ′′2 )
in ( µ′1 tµ′ µ′2 , µ′′1 tµ′′ µ′′2 )
The functional map :: (α ⇒ β) ⇒ α list ⇒ β list applies a function to all
elements of a list. The function zip :: α list ⇒ β list ⇒ (α× β) list returns the
list of pairs of elements formed from the elements of two given lists. The length
of the resulting list is the minimum of the input list’s lengths.
The model of the memory as described in Section 3.2 has been encapsulated
in a locale called loc2_ M having as parameters the equivalence relation be-
tween memories (') defined in Section 4.1, the merging function merge_mem,
the lookup and update functions for both simple and array variables and the
function T _size . All the properties about these functions needed for the proof
of non-interference are stated as assumptions of the locale.
The refined model as explained in this section is encapsulated in a locale
called loc3_ M. In the context of loc3_ M we can prove the validity of the
assumptions in loc2_ M for the given instantiations. Proving that loc3_ M is
a refinement of loc2_ M is done in Isabelle via the following statement:
interpretation loc3_ M ⊆ loc2_ M
This command interprets loc2_ M in the locale loc3_ M. It requires a proof
that the specification of loc3_ M implies the specification of loc2_ M.
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6.2 A tax calculation program
We illustrate the use of our type system by proving type correctness of a simple
example that combines the use of parallelism, arrays and a scheduler. We reuse
the example in [15] about a tax calculation program, where given an array of
taxable incomes, the program outputs the corresponding array of income taxes.
To place it in a concurrent setting, let us suppose that the array of taxable
incomes is too big to be processed directly by the tax calculation program.
Hence, we adopt a producer/consumer solution. The idea is to use two processes,
producer and consumer, that share a common, bounded buffer. The producer
puts information into the buffer and the consumer takes it out. In our present
example the producer writes the values from the array of taxable incomes into
the buffer, and the consumer, which corresponds to our tax calculation program,
removes the values from the buffer and calculates their income taxes. Trouble
may arise when the producer attempts to put a new item in a full buffer or
the consumer tries to remove an item from an empty buffer. The solution used
here is taken from [3]. Besides, a scheduler manages the execution times of the
producer and the consumer.
We define two levels L and H with L being lower than H.
consts L :: level
H :: level
axioms L_sub_H : L v H
We consider a simplified version of the tax calculation program where we have
as inputs:
1. An array called brackets of the limits separating income brackets, with
security type (L, L) ,
2. an array TaxTable with the taxable incomes for each income bracket, with
security type (L, L) and
3. the array of taxable incomes, taxableIncome with security type (H, L) ,
to be processed.
The goal is to fill in an array incomeTax with the tax owed for each tax return.
The typing for this output array is (H, L) .
Given these tables, we calculate the income tax for taxable income t by using
binary search to find an index b such that brackets[b] ≤t < brackets[b+1]
and then return TaxTable[b] .
We define each variable as a constant in Isabelle and state its type by an
axiom. For example, for taxableIncome we have:
consts taxableIncome :: T
axioms l_taxableIncome : getlevel_array taxableIncome = (H, L)
The definition of the main program is the following:
constdefs Parallel_TaxCalcul :: P
Parallel_TaxCalcul ≡ INIT;;
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Sched [[ (when ( λ( µ1 , µ2 ). ( µ2 s)!0=1) do Producer) ‖
(when ( λ( µ1 , µ2 ). ( µ2 s)!1=1) do Consumer) ]]
where the Isabelle notation xs! i indicates the ith component of a list xs. The
first part INIT initializes all auxiliary variables to the null function. The variable
s is an array with two components, one for the Producer and one for the
Consumer , each component can take the values 0 or 1, which blocks or enables
their execution, respectively. They are initialized to zero by INIT , and are
alternatively set to 1 by a scheduler that implements round robin with a time
slice of length buffer .
As shown in the boolean conditions of the when-statements above, the en-
coding of boolean and arithmetic expressions uses lambda terms. For clarity,
we hide in the following the lambda abstractions over the memory and simply
write the names of locations or of arrays.
The definition of the scheduler is:
%constdefs Sched :: P
Sched ≡ n:== 0;;
while True do
(k:== 0;;
while k < length buffer do
(s[n + 1]:== 1;;
s[n + 1]:== 0;;
k:== k + 1) ;;
n:== (n + 1) mod 2)
The Producer and Consumer are defined as follows:
Producer ≡
while i < length taxableIncome do
x:== taxableIncome!i;;
when ins - outs < length buffer do
(buffer[ins mod (length buffer)]:== x;;
ins:== ins + 1) ;;
i:== i + 1
Consumer ≡
while j < length taxableIncome do
Remove;;
BinarySearch;;
incomeTax[j]:== TaxTable!lo
j:== j + 1
Remove is the part of the program where the consumer removes its input from
the buffer:
Remove ≡
when outs < ins do
y:== buffer!(outs mod (length buffer));;
outs:== outs + 1
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and the BinarySearch part corresponds to the calculation in lo of the corre-
sponding income bracket using binary search.
BinarySearch ≡
lo :== 0 ;; hi :== length brackets;;
while lo + 1 < hi do
(mid:== (lo + hi) div 2;;
if y < brackets!mid
then hi:== mid
else lo:== mid)
To see whether the program is accepted by our type system we must find ac-
ceptable types for the auxiliary variables. Since the contents of TaxableIncome
are high, so must be the variable x and also the contents of the auxiliary array
buffer , whose type is thus (H, L) . By the assignment in Remove we deduce
that y is also of level H. Thus, the if command within BinarySearch has an H
guard, which means that the branches must not assign to L variables. So, hi and
low must be of level H. From the assignment to mid , we deduce that mid must
also be a high level variable. In Consumer , following the high-guarded condi-
tional of BinarySearch there are two assignments, one to the array incomeTax ,
whose contents are high and then the update of the variable j which must then
be also high. Since j is high the guard of the Consumer ’s while is also high,
that means that the body can only assign to high level variables. Thus, outs
is also high. Since outs is high so must be the guard of the when-statement
inside Producer implying that variables ins and i must also be high. Variables
k and n have security type L and the array s has type (L, L) .
With these typings it is straightforward to verify that the program is well
typed under our type system.
lemma Parallel_TaxCalcul_typable: ` Parallel_TaxCalcul . L H
Having Isabelle as an assistant automates the type checking and helps to iden-
tify the right types easily. We have stated the security types of arithmetic
and boolean expressions as axioms. For an extensive use of Isabelle to check
type correctness it would be more reliable to formalize expressions using a deep
embedding and prove correctness of the corresponding type system.
7 Conclusion
We have presented the first machine-checked proof of non-interference for a con-
current language inspired from [13], and featuring primitives for scheduling. Our
work demonstrates that it is possible to use proof assistants in the design or the
verification of advanced type systems for programming languages, and is thus in
line with the philosophy of the POPLMark Challenge [4], which aims at gener-
alizing the use of theorem provers for checking the meta-theory of programming
languages.
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7.1 Related work
7.1.1 Information flow type systems for concurrent languages
Providing appropriate notions of non-interference and associated static enforce-
ment mechanisms for concurrent programs is extremely challenging, and there
have been many attempts to provide a satisfactory solution to guaranteeing con-
fidentiality of concurrent programs. Some relevant works are discussed below;
it should be noted that we have no claim to exhaustiveness and refer the reader
to [40] for a detailed account of the field up to 2003.
Non-interference in presence of concurrency and distribution has been in-
vestigated thoroughly; in particular, many works have conducted an analysis
and comparison of the possible notions of non-interference for non-deterministic
systems, notably in the context of process calculi, see for example [16]. In
an attempt to bridge the gap between (sequential) programming languages and
process calculi, Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld [17] establish a relation between se-
curity conditions for programming languages and security conditions for process
calculi. A similar endeavor was conducted earlier by Mantel and Sabelfeld [26],
who provide a link between security conditions for programming languages and
security conditions for event systems.
Smith and Volpano [47] provide the first information flow type system that
allows static enforcement of non-interference for a multi-threaded programming
language. As mentioned in the introduction, their type system is rather restric-
tive in that while loops cannot test on high expressions (in order to guarantee
the soundness of the type system, and in particular to reject the example of
the introduction). Later, in order to avoid the issue of refinement attacks in
presence of scheduling, Volpano and Smith [51, 50] and also Smith [46] focus on
probabilistic non-interference for uniform schedulers, i.e. schedulers that select
the thread to execute from a finite set of threads with a uniform probability
distribution. Stronger, scheduler-independent, notions of non-interference were
proposed as well by Sabelfeld and Sands [42, 43] for a language with probabilis-
tic choice. Their security condition is defined using partial equivalence relations
(PERs), and is shown to be enforceable with an information flow type system
that rejects while loops that test on high expressions.
Among the works that do not consider probabilistic non-interference, one
finds the work by Zdancewic and Myers [53] on observational non-interference.
In a nutshell, their notion of security considers low equivalence of traces up to
prefix and stuttering, and is shown to be enforceable for a programming lan-
guage with a rich set of features for concurrency, using a combination of an
information flow type system and of another analysis to guarantee race free-
dom. Other facets of concurrency for which information flow type systems have
been devised include synchronization and synchronous programming: indeed,
Sabelfeld [39] proposes a type and effect system that enforces non-interference
for a language with synchronization primitives, and Matos, Boudol and Castel-
lani develop in [29] a sound information flow type system for a reactive lan-
guage closely related to the language presented here. More recently, Russo and
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Sabelfeld [38] have suggested that controlling the interactions between threads
and the scheduler provides an adequate means to enforce permissive policies for
concurrent languages.
Information flow type systems have also been thoroughly investigated in the
context of process calculi. In particular, [19, 21, 22, 34] provide information flow
type systems for the π-calculus [45]. In addition, Honda and Yoshida [21, 22]
also establish type-preserving compilation from the information flow type system
of [49] for a simple imperative language to their information flow type systems.
Several other works study characterizations of non-interference using pro-
gram logics for concurrent programs: for example Joshi and Leino [24, 25]
propose an equational characterization of non-interference, whereas Barthe,
D’Argenio and Rezk [8] propose a characterization of non-interference in tempo-
ral logic. Recently, Huisman, Worah and Sunesen [23] extend the results of [8]
to characterize observational equivalence [53]. While these characterizations
can be used to verify statically that a program is non-interfering, they need to
rely on user interaction if the domain of values is infinite. Recently, Dam [14]
has shown that some notions of non-interference are decidable if the domain of
values is finite; however, the definition of non-interference used in this paper is
not decidable.
Finally, there are works that aim at combining different verification tech-
niques rather than committing to a specific technique before hand. For example,
Mantel, Sudbrock and Krausser [27] study the possibility of such combinations.
7.1.2 Machine-checked proofs of non-interference
While programming language research papers are seldom supported by machine-
checked proofs, machine-checked verification of programming languages (oper-
ational semantics, type systems, compilers) is receiving increasing interest from
the programming language community, and recent achievements demonstrate
the feasibility of such tasks. Nevertheless, much of the work to-date has been
focusing on safety type systems. In fact, only a few works have focused on
information flow.
Motivated by the need to provide accurate models for verifying secure sys-
tems, Rushby [37] considers a notion of so-called “intransitive” non-interference
which allows information release through a trusted downgrader, and establishes
an unwinding theorem that provides a set of sufficient conditions for a system
to be secure. The whole account is formalized using the verification system
EHDM, a precursor to PVS.
Naumann [31] and Strecker [48] have also provided machined-checked proofs
of soundness for information flow type systems for a (sequential) fragment of
Java that includes objects and methods. Their language, type system and formal
proofs are inspired from [7, 6], and consider a termination-insensitive, input-
output based notion of non-interference.
However, we do not know of any machine-checked proof of non-interference
for a concurrent programming language.
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7.2 Future work
We intend to pursue our work along two different axes.
Language expressiveness: While expressive, the programming language mod-
eled in this paper falls short of the complexity of modern programming
languages. The objective of this line of work is to adapt and extend our
results to richer or more realistic settings. There are several obvious steps
to take: first of all, we would like to adapt our results to a programming
language with procedures and exceptions; a more challenging goal would
be to apply our type system to a concurrent fragment of Java. Second
of all, it would seem interesting to generalize our proofs to programming
languages with support for synchronous programming. In [11], Boudol
proposes a core language for global computing, called ULM, with features
such as instants and broadcasts which exhibit an interesting behavior from
the point of view of information flow. Using the results of [29], it should
be possible to adapt our formal proofs to ULM. In the medium term, it
may be of interest to derive similar results for process calculi, using the
works mentioned in the previous paragraph. Isabelle formalizations exist
for some process calculi and could be used as a basis to formally machine-
check the correctness of the information flow type systems for these process
calculi: for example, there exist several machine-checked formalizations of
π-calculus, see e.g. [36] for one example of such a formalization using
Isabelle/HOL.
Security policy: While non-interference provides an elegant semantical condi-
tion that guarantees confidentiality, it also imposes stringent restrictions
that reduce its applicability. Thus many works have focused on weaker
definitions of confidentiality that admit some controlled form of informa-
tion release. It would be interesting to adapt and extend our results to
more realistic semantical definitions of security, such as those considered
in [44]. Of course, the difficulty of the endeavor will vary greatly depending
on the definition considered: for example, it should be reasonably feasible
to adapt our results to account for delimited information release [41], or for
the non-disclosure policy [28], whereas adapting our results to encryption,
see e.g. [52] is substantially more challenging. In order to accommodate
security definitions for which no information flow type system exists, it
would also be interesting to investigate logical characterizations of non-
interference and related definitions in the spirit of [8].
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one could also consider more strin-
gent security conditions such as timing-sensitive non-interference, and
prove the correctness of program transformations that ensure such stronger
conditions, see e.g.[2].
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